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1 Introduction
Practical commitments lie at the level of regulative (or preservative) norms that,
in turn, impact on the agents' behavior, creating social expectations, that should
not be frustrated. By a practical commitment, in fact, an actor (debtor) is com-
mitted towards another actor (creditor) to bring about something [6, 17], i.e. to
act either directly or by persuading others so as to make a condition of interest
become true. Due to their social nature, practical commitments are a powerful
tool that helps to overcome the controversial assumptions of the mentalistic ap-
proach that mental states are veriable and that agents are sincere. Moreover,
they support an observational semantics for communication that allows verifying
an agent's compliance with its commitments based on observable behavior.
From the seminal paper by Singh [18], commitments protocols have been rais-
ing a lot of attention, see for instance [23, 14, 21, 9, 20, 11, 3]. The key feature of
commitment protocols is their declarative nature, which allows specifying them
in a way which abstracts away from any reference to the actual behaviour of the
agents, thus avoiding to impose useless execution constraints [24]. By doing so,
commitment-based protocols respect the autonomy of agents because whatever
action they decide to perform is ne as long as they accomplished their com-
mitments, satisfying each others' expectations. Now, after more than ten years
from the introduction of commitments, it is time to ask (i) if a \commitment
to do something" is the only kind of regulative norm, that we need in order to
give a social semantics to a physical action, and (ii) if they realize what they
promised. To this aim, we think that there are four intertwined aspects to be
considered:
1. Agent Coordination: how to account for coordination patterns?
2. Infrastructure for Execution: which is the reference execution infrastructure?
3. Observability of Events: are events really observable by all agents?
4. Composition of Coordination Patterns: is composition inuenced by the pre-
vious aspects?
Fig. 1. The four considered intertwined aspects.
2 Agent Coordination
Commitment protocols leave the choice of which action to execute and when,
totally up to the single agents. From a more general perspective, they do not
impose constraints on the possible evolutions of the social state. However, in
many practical cases there is the need to capture regulative aspects of agent
coordination. For instance, a customer and a merchant may agree that payment
should be done before shipping but how to represent this socially agreed con-
straint in commitment protocols? When a similar coordination is desired by the
parties, one feels the lack of the means for capturing them as regulations inside
the protocol. Notice that the desired coordination patterns, though restricting
the choices up to the agents, would not prevent exibility because, for instance,
it is not mandatory that payment and shipping are one next to the other. What
matters is their relative order. More importantly, an agreed coordination pat-
tern establishes the boundaries within which each party can exercise his/her own
autonomy without compromising the aims for which the agreement was taken.
Citing Dwight Eisenhower1 \To be true to one's own freedom is, in essence, to
honor and respect the freedom of all others." As long as agents respect such con-
straints, they are free to customize the execution at their will, e.g. by interleaving
the two actions with others (like sending a receipt or asking a quote for another
item). This need is felt by the research community, see [3] for an overview.
When regulations are expressed, agents can individually check whether their
behavior conforms to the specication [2]. But in order to guarantee to the others
that one will act in a way that conforms to the regulation, an agent should for-
mally bind its behavior to the regulation itself. The proposal in [3], for instance,
allows the representation of temporal regulations imposed on the evolution of
the social state, however, it does not supply a deontic semantics to the con-
straints. Therefore the agents' behavior is not formally bound to them. On the
other hand, the Regula framework [16] uses precedence logic to express tem-
poral patterns that can be used as antecedent (or consequent) conditions inside
1 State of the Union Address, Feb. 2, 1953.
commitments. Since patterns may involve various parties, the framework also
introduces a notion of condition control and of commitment safety, in order to
allow agents to reason about the advisability of taking a commitment. However,
patterns are not generally expressed on the evolution of the social state but are
limited to events.
3 Infrastructure for Execution and Observability of
Events
Commitments were introduced to support run-time verication in contrast to
the mentalistic approach but despite this, they still lack of a reference infras-
tructure that practically enables such a verication. Verication is supported
by proposals like [1, 7], although the authors do not draft an infrastructure,
while commitment machines [24, 21, 19] have mainly been used to provide an
operational semantics. Normative approaches, e.g. institutions [13, 14], provide
an answer but with some limitation. Indeed, they tend to implicitly assume a
centralized vision, often realized by introducing a new actor, whose task is to
monitor the interaction: the institution itself. This assumption is coherent with
the fact that commitment protocols tend to assume that events are uniformly
observed by all the agents although in the real world this seldom happens; for
instance, communications tend to be point-to-point. We need the infrastructure
to support this kind of interaction and to monitor, in this context, the on-going
enactment, checking whether it respects all the regulative aspects { that the
designer identied as relevant or that the agents agreed. Chopra and Singh [8]
addressed the issue of realizing an architecture that relaxes the centralization
constraint by incorporating the notion of commitment alignment. In this way
it becomes possible to answer to questions like \how to decide whether agents
are acting in a way that complies to the regulations or not?", \How to know
that an agent satised one of its commitments?" in contexts where events are
not uniformly observable. Nevertheless, they relegated commitment alignment
to the middleware, shielding the issue of observability of events from the agents
and from the designer. Our claim is that this is a limitation and that in many
real-world situations it is more desirable to have the means of making clear who
can access to what information and who is accountable for reporting what event.
This is especially true in the case when the protocol allows the representation of
coordination patterns: there is the need of mechanisms for expressing who can
observe what, tracking which part of a pattern was already followed, which is
left to be performed, who is in charge of the next moves, and so on. As a con-
sequence, we think that the specication of the coordination patterns and the
design of the infrastructure cannot leave out the observability of events, which
plays a fundamental role at the level of the protocol specication and, for this
reason, it should be captured by rst-class abstractions and appropriate regula-
tions. Such abstractions/regulations should be represented in a way that makes
them directly manipulable by the agents [4].
4 Composition of Coordination Patterns
Most of the works concerning software engineering aspects of commitment proto-
col specication focus on the formal verication to help the protocol designer to
get rid of or to enforce given behaviors, [22, 15, 5, 12, 11]. An aspect that is not to
be underestimated is the realization of a development methodology for commit-
ment protocols. The most relevant representative is the Amoeba methodology
[10], which allows the design of commitment protocols and their composition
into complex business processes. With respect to the aspects that we are dis-
cussing, this methodology, however, has two main limits. On the one hand, when
two or more protocols are composed, the designer is requested to dene a set of
temporal constraints among events and of data ow constraints to combine the
various parts. However, such constraints do not have any regulatory avour nor
they have a deontic characterization. On the other hand, since a wider number
of roles are involved, which of the actors of one protocol is entitled to (and phys-
ically can) observe events generated inside another protocol? The methodology
does not explicitly account for this problem in the description of the various
steps that compose it. For instance, suppose of composing a protocol that allows
a merchant and a supplier to interact with one that allows the same merchant to
interact with a customer. It is unrealistic to suppose that the client can observe
events involving the supplier, even though after the composition both actors will
play in the same protocol. Actually, it would be useful to incorporate in the
protocol the means for letting the merchant tell the client that it received items
from the supplier in a way that makes it accountable for its declarations.
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